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Th is case study reviews the enactment and 
implementation of the National Security Personnel 
System (NSPS) in the U.S. Department of Defense. 
Proponents of reform seized the opportunity to enact 
reform in the aftermath of 9/11, basing their arguments 
on national security concerns. However, the policy-
making process did not produce a consensus for reform 
among key stakeholders in the personnel management 
policy community. Instead, the NSPS angered and 
alienated the Offi  ce of Personnel Management, the 
public employee unions, and a number of congressional 
Democrats. Implementation of the NSPS became 
problematic as Defense Department offi  cials attempted 
to move quickly and independently to get the new system 
online, eventually forcing the department to put the 
system on hold. In the end, Congress imposed limits on 
its implementation, advocates for the system disappeared, 
and a new president supported the repeal of NSPS. Th is 
case provides useful insights into the formulation of future 
strategies for personnel management reform.
Between 2002 and 2004, the George W. Bush administration and Congress created two new personnel management systems: one for the 
Department of Homeland Security as part of the 
Homeland Security Act of 2002, and another for the 
Department of Defense (DoD), the National Secu-
rity Personnel System (NSPS), under the National 
Defense Authorization bill for fi scal year 2005. 
“National security” was a crucial rhetorical lever in 
both cases, and 9/11 provided the impetus for changes 
in personnel management (Brook and King 2007; 
Brook et al. 2006). Here, we present a case study of 
the enactment and implementation of the National 
Security Personnel System for 
the Department of Defense.
To assemble this report, we 
reviewed more than 500 docu-
ments, either in the public record 
or provided by participants. 
Included are transcripts of 
interviews with other participants 
conducted by the offi  ce of the Defense Department 
historian. Additionally, we drew from transcripts of our 
own interviews with key participants in the case.
Policy Formulation: Designing the NSPS
Shortly after 9/11, Secretary of Defense Donald 
Rumsfeld publicly called for a transformation in the 
Department of Defense and asked his staff  for trans-
formational statutory, regulatory, and policy changes 
(Chu 2007). Ginger Groeber, then deputy under 
secretary of defense for civilian personnel policy, said 
that her offi  ce provided a few ideas that they thought 
“would fl y politically, which was pay banding . . . 
[and] . . . a diff erent compensation system that would 
move away from the general schedule system.” After 
reviewing this proposal, Rumsfeld reportedly respond-
ed, “Is that all there is? Are you kidding me? Is this all 
you guys want to change?” (Groeber 2007). 
David Chu, under secretary of defense for personnel 
and readiness, recalled that Rumsfeld told him to “go 
for everything you can.” Rumsfeld’s challenge coin-
cided with the completion of the department’s “Best 
Practices Initiative,” and Chu saw it as an opportunity 
to “consider extending these [Best Practices] authori-
ties to the entire Department” (Chu 2007). In addi-
tion, personnel demonstration projects and alternative 
personnel systems conducted by the DoD under the 
Civil Service Reform Act of 1978 had tested a variety 
of personnel management policies and procedures that 
would infl uence the design of the NSPS. Features of 
these experiments included pay bands, a performance-
based pay system for white-collar employees, increased 
fl exibility for starting salaries, modifi ed reduction-in-
force procedures, extended pro-
bationary periods, distinguished 
scholastic achievement appoint-
ments, modifi ed term appoint-
ments, a voluntary emeritus 
corps, enhanced training and 
development, sabbaticals, and 
fl exible probationary periods 
(OPM 2009, 3–5).
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others to act” (U.S. House Armed Services Committee 2003, 
1350).
OMB Mediates between the DoD and OPM
With the DoD and OPM unable to reach agreement on major 
issues, the OMB stepped in to resolve the diff erences. One critical 
meeting was chaired by then–White House chief of staff  Andrew 
Card. Card allowed the DoD’s provision for a national security 
waiver to remain in the bill; he also decided that the DoD could not 
waive veterans’ preference or create its own Senior Executive Service. 
Both the OPM and DoD felt that they had lost portions of the 
debate, but the resulting NSPS legislative proposal now became the 
administration’s position. Despite each side’s adherence to the of-
fi cial administration position, the disagreements between the DoD 
and OPM would continue behind the scenes.
The Administration and the Unions
Offi  cials of the American Federation of Government Employees 
(AFGE) also were frustrated with the NSPS proposal, arguing that the 
DoD had failed to provide specifi c details about the new system and 
why it was needed. Further, the unions argued that DoD had no real 
interest in collaborating with unions, and that DoD decision makers 
had a right-wing, anti-union agenda. According to AFGE chief of 
staff  Brian DeWyngaert, trying to get detailed information from the 
DoD was always a problem because “they would never give [us] any-
thing specifi c” (DeWyngaert 2007). He said that he consistently asked 
what specifi c problems the DoD was trying to address, but all he got 
was what he termed “rhetoric” and vague arguments, such as the need 
for “fl exibility to win all future wars” (DeWyngaert 2007).
At its initial meeting with the DoD in January 2002, the AFGE 
proposed that it work together with the administration on labor–
management relations, employee recognition and compensation, 
adverse actions, and the appeals process (DeWyngaert 2007). 
However, DeWyngaert concluded that the DoD leaders were not 
really interested in working with the AFGE on reform issues: “Th eir 
disdain for working with the unions as legitimate partners overrode 
any interest in getting true reform” (DeWyngaert 2007). Another 
factor that may have aff ected the relationship between the unions 
and the administration was the leadership transition within the 
AFGE, with Bobby Harnage succeeding John Gage as national 
president in August 2003. Gage had been critical of Harnage for 
being too cooperative with the administration. Gage was even more 
critical of personnel reforms than Harnage had been, and he also 
was highly critical of the Bush administration (Chu 2008).
Nevertheless, on April 10, 2003, DoD general counsel William 
J. Haynes III sent a memorandum of proposed legislation to the 
Speaker of the House and the president of the Senate, the Defense 
Transformation for the 21st Century Act (DoD, Offi  ce of Deputy 
Under Secretary of Defence 2003, cover memoranda). Th is proposal 
included a National Security Personnel System along with a stream-
lined acquisition system, realistic appropriations and authorization 
laws, and the coordination of the activities of the DoD with other 
departments and agencies concerned with national security (1). 
Section 101 of the proposed act contained the provisions for NSPS 
(3–25). Th is proposal would mark the beginning of a complicated 
and unusual congressional process involving multiple committees 
and multiple versions of the bill.
The Original NSPS Proposal
Galvanized by Rumsfeld’s encouragement, Groeber and Charlie 
Abell, then principal deputy under secretary of defense for person-
nel and readiness, worked with Helen Sullivan, the DoD’s senior 
associate deputy general counsel for labor relations, to draft the 
original NSPS proposal. Abell wanted it to be very broad in scope 
but concise in length. He suggested to Chu,
Let’s propose an authority that says, in two lines, “the Secre-
tary of Defense shall develop a civilian personnel policy for 
the national security arena,” period, amen. Let’s not go over 
[there] with a bureaucratic, laid-out skeleton with fl esh on it. 
Let’s go as broad as we can because, in the process, everybody 
around us will add things to this, and so we ought to give 
them the barest bones to which they could add things, and 
we’ll end up with a more structured system than we would 
hope for. (Abell 2007)
Th e DoD also sought independence from and power over the 
Offi  ce of Personnel Management (OPM), the agency that typi-
cally served as the steward of personnel changes in the federal 
government. Chu and Abell planned to exempt the DoD from 
Title 5 of the U.S. Code—in which civil service policy normally 
is codifi ed—and  instead to place the NSPS under Title 10, which 
codifi es laws pertaining to the armed forces. Th e original NSPS 
legislative proposal was worded as follows: “Notwithstanding all 
other titles, the Secretary of Defense may create his own human 
resources management system” (Sullivan 2007). Th ey wrote this 
fi rst draft as a proposed amendment to Title 10, and they did so 
without input from the OPM, Offi  ce of Management and Budget 
(OMB), or external stakeholders such as the public employee 
unions.
After completing the original draft, the DoD submitted it directly 
to the OMB without consulting the OPM. Th e OPM strongly 
objected. Th e DoD wanted its personnel system to be exempt 
from Title 5, but the OPM believed that it had enough fl exibil-
ity under Title 5 to accommodate the DoD’s objectives. OPM 
offi  cials also argued that if the DoD was exempt from Title 5, it 
would have an unfair advantage in recruiting and retaining civil 
service  employees.
Revising the NSPS Proposal
Th e OPM prevailed in its argument to keep the DoD’s personnel 
system under Title 5. Th e OMB told the DoD to redraft the pro-
posal to be consistent with the title’s provisions, but also to base the 
NSPS on the model of the recently enacted Homeland Security Act 
of 2002. Based on this OMB guidance, the DoD made the recom-
mended changes. However, some of the original DoD authorities 
were retained, including wording to provide the secretary of defense 
with a national security waiver to override the requirement that 
he jointly prescribe all NSPS regulations in coordination with the 
director of the OPM.
Th roughout the revision process, the OPM argued for the 
importance of achieving government-wide civil service reform, 
whereas the DoD maintained that it needed to specifi cally reform 
the department to meet national security needs. Chu argued that 
“our national security responsibilities do not allow us to wait for 
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After two days of committee debate, the HASC marked up and sent 
the bill to the full House for consideration. On May 22, 2003, the 
House passed H.R. 1588 by a vote of 361–68.
Meanwhile, on May 6, the House Government Reform Committee 
held hearings on H.R. 1836, the Civil Service and National Security 
Personnel Improvement Act (U.S. House Government Reform 
Committee 2003, 1). In his opening remarks, Chairman Davis 
stated that “one of the most signifi cant elements of this legislation 
is the National Security Personnel System proposal for the Depart-
ment of Defense” (2).
As in the HASC, the time allotted was limited to just a few days of 
hearings. Th e committee completed its markup of H.R. 1836 on 
May 7. Th en, on May 13, 2003, SASC chairman John Warner (R-
VA) introduced S. 1050, the Senate version of the National Defense 
Authorization Act. Warner’s bill did not contain any NSPS provi-
sions. Instead, Warner elected to defer to the Senate Governmental 
Aff airs Committee on NSPS matters.
On June 2, Senator Collins, chair of the Senate Governmental 
 Aff airs Committee, introduced S. 1166, the National Security Person-
nel Act. Th e bill supported “the administration’s request concerning 
a new pay system and on-the-spot hiring authority” but denied the 
“authority to omit the Merit Systems Protection Board . . . from the 
appeals process” (U.S. Senate Governmental Aff airs Committee 
2003, 3) and also prevented the secretary of defense from waiving 
the collective bargaining rights of employees, both key objections 
raised by the unions. Th e committee marked up S. 1166 on June 
17 and ordered the bill to be reported to the full Senate (Schwemle 
2005, 3). S. 1166 never passed the Senate, but “it became the basis 
for the Senate’s negotiating position [on NSPS] in conference” 
(Levine 2008).
Markup of the Surviving Bills
HASC chairman Hunter supported the NSPS but looked to Gov-
ernment Reform Committee chairman Davis to craft the package 
that would go into the Defense Authorization Bill (Alinger 2008). 
Th e Government Reform Committee’s markup of H.R. 1836, the 
Civil Service and National Security Personnel Improvement Act, 
was a diffi  cult negotiation: it took nine hours and was very conten-
tious between supporters of the administration and supporters of 
the union positions (Alinger 2008).
After the markup, the HASC took that language and put it into the 
National Defense Authorization Act (Alinger 2008). In the end, 
the cooperation between the HASC and the Government Reform 
Committee was critical to fi nalizing the personnel portions of the 
bill: “Th is  gave them [the HASC] the leverage to say, ‘Th e Govern-
ment Reform Committee has spoken on this. Th ey’re the experts on 
personnel policy’” (Alinger 2008). Th e bill, with the NSPS includ-
ed, passed the HASC and was sent to the full House for considera-
tion. On May 22, 2003, the House passed H.R. 1588 by a vote of 
361–68.
On June 17, the Senate Governmental Aff airs Committee approved 
S. 1166, its version of the DoD personnel management reform. 
Chairman Collins had successfully positioned S. 1166 as an alterna-
tive to the House-passed NSPS (Schwemle 2005, 3).
Nontraditional Congressional Consideration: Enactment 
without Consensus
Four congressional committees could claim jurisdiction over person-
nel matters in the DoD. Normally, civil service matters would fall 
under the jurisdiction of the Senate Governmental  Aff airs Com-
mittee and the House Government Reform Committee. However, 
a strategy emerged to deal with the NSPS as part of the annual 
defense authorization bill, which meant that the Senate and House 
Armed Services committees (HASC and SASC) could assert 
 jurisdiction.
Legislation Introduced
In the House, H.R. 1588, the National Defense Authorization Act 
for Fiscal Year 2004, was introduced on April 4 and referred to the 
HASC for hearings and debate (Foss 2004, 31). Th e proposed bill 
did not contain any NSPS provisions.
In the Senate, S. 927, the Defense Transformation for the 21st 
Century Act, was introduced on April 28, 2003 (U.S. Senate Armed 
Services Committee 2003, 1). No further action was taken on it by 
the SASC (Foss 2004, 33). However, Senator Carl Levin (D-MI), 
ranking minority member of the SASC, later joined Senator Susan 
Collins (R-ME), chair of the Senate Governmental Aff airs Com-
mittee and a member of the SASC, in introducing S. 1166, the 
National Security Personnel Act, which also contained provisions 
that called for the establishment of the NSPS (U.S. Senate Armed 
Services Committee 2003, 4).
Back in the House, Government Reform Committee chairman Tom 
Davis (R-VA) introduced H.R. 1836, the Civil Service and National 
Security Personnel Improvement Act, on April 29, 2003. Th e bill 
was referred to Davis’s committee.
Committee Hearings
On May 1, 2003, the HASC held hearings on H.R. 1588, the 
National Defense Authorization Act. In his opening remarks to the 
committee, Chairman Duncan Hunter (R-CA) noted that “one 
of the most important and possibly controversial elements of this 
package is the creation of the National Security Personnel System” 
(U.S. House Armed Services Committee 2003, 1232). Hunter 
expressed hope that the committee could “arrive at a balanced pack-
age of management tools to help the Department better execute its 
paramount mission: to keep our nation secure in a very uncertain 
and turbulent time” (1232).
AFGE president Bobby Harnage strongly opposed the NSPS legisla-
tion, arguing that Congress was handing over its authority to the 
DoD and the secretary of defense:
Th is bill is asking—no, it is insisting—that you hand your 
authority on each of these matters to the Department 
and each successive Secretary of Defense. Th ey will make 
those decisions, not you . . . DoD’s proposal allows every 
new Secretary of Defense, without congressional input, to 
impose a new fl avor-of-the-week pay-and-personnel system 
of its own design. And employees and their representatives 
will have nothing whatsoever to say about it, and neither 
will you. (U.S. House Armed Services Committee 2003, 
1315)
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by the Offi  ce of the Under Secretary of Defense for Personnel and 
Readiness, which ultimately resulted in a false start. Th e second 
phase, in spring 2004, was a “strategic pause” taken in the face of 
implementation issues and criticism from the unions and the OPM. 
During this phase, the DoD tried to regroup and develop a new ap-
proach to implementation. Th e strategic pause was followed by the 
third phase of implementation, the formation of the Program Ex-
ecutive Offi  ce for NSPS. Th e fourth phase involved a new president 
and Congress acting to end the NSPS.
Phase 1: A False Start (November 24, 2003–March 11, 2004)
Th e initial implementation strategy was led by the offi  ce of David 
Chu, the under secretary of defense for personnel and readiness. Th e 
initial design for the NSPS was based on the recommendations of 
Chu’s “Best Practices Initiative” in the areas of (1) pay banding, (2) 
classifi cation, (3) hiring and appointment, (4) pay for performance, 
(5) sabbatical authority, (6) volunteer service, and (7) reduction-
in-force procedures (DoD 2003). Employees would be classifi ed 
into three broad pay bands called “career groups” (CG) based on 
their job descriptions: professional and administrative management 
(CG1); engineering, scientifi c, and medical support (CG2); and 
business and administrative support (CG3) (DoD 2004, 3). Within 
each of the career groups, there were to be four pay bands.
Chu’s strategy was to get the NSPS implemented as quickly as 
possible. Th e plan was released in November 2003 and included an 
estimated timetable and broad strategy for implementation (DoD, 
Offi  ce of Deputy Under Secretary of Defense 2003). Th e DoD 
estimated that the NSPS implementation would cost $158 million 
up to 2008. Th e department did not seek any additional funding for 
NSPS implementation; instead, it intended to shift money within 
the existing budget to cover all transition costs (Barr 2004a).
Under this strategy, the NSPS would be activated once perform-
ance management systems and training were in place. After the fi nal 
NSPS regulations were published, the DoD would implement the 
NSPS by converting its employees in phases beginning April 2004 
(Bunn 2007; Chu 2007; Curry 2007). Th e initial phase would 
convert 300,000 civilian General Schedule (GS) employees to the 
NSPS by October 1, 2004. Th e original estimate was that it would 
take less than two years to convert the bulk of 
DoD civilians to the NSPS (Ginsberg 2008).
Th e legislation did not specify which unions 
the department needed to consult during the 
design phase. At the time, 7 of the 45 unions 
had national consultation rights, meaning 
they had the right “to be consulted on agency-
wide regulations before they were promul-
gated” (OPM 2009). For the fi rst meeting on 
January 22, 2004, the department decided to 
invite only the unions with national consul-
tation rights, plus one union representing 
the others. But after complaints from the 
excluded unions, the DoD invited all of the 
unions.
Th e unions publicly voiced their opposition immediately after the 
DoD issued a document titled “National Security Personnel System 
Final Agreement between Congress and the White House
On July 16, the House and Senate agreed to a conference to resolve 
diff erences between the two versions of the defense authorization 
bills, H.R. 1588 and S. 1050. Deliberations over the fi nal version 
of the National Defense Authorization Act and whether the bill 
should include the NSPS took place over months and encompassed 
a number of contentious meetings. It was unusual to be discussing 
personnel matters in an armed services conference, where members 
generally would be more focused on defense matters. But there were 
still disagreements over labor relations. A turning point occurred 
during a meeting hosted by the OMB to negotiate fi nal issues 
between the administration and congressional staff  members, dur-
ing which Abell proposed a sunset provision (Abell 2007), which 
some participants believed was what ultimately broke the logjam 
(Hemingway 2008). After nearly four months of deliberation, the 
conference report passed the House on November 11. Th e following 
day, the Senate passed the conference report.
Th us, based on national security concerns, NSPS supporters success-
fully framed the personnel reforms as part of the National Defense 
Authorization Act. Even though traditional civil service committees 
considered the legislation, it was the armed services committees that 
made the fi nal decisions on the legislation; in a shift of roles, the 
more experienced civil service committees had less infl uence, while 
the less experienced armed services committees had more decision-
making authority. Th ese circumstances created a policy environment 
that empowered the DoD and presented a good opportunity to 
enact the NSPS.
On November 24, 2003, President Bush signed the National 
Defense Authorization Act, including authority to implement the 
NSPS, into law. Th is victory did not come without costs, however. 
Th e policy-making process did not produce a consensus for reform 
among key stakeholders in the personnel management policy com-
munity. Instead, the NSPS angered and alienated the OPM, the 
AFGE, and a number of congressional Democrats. Th e fi ght over 
personnel management reform in the DoD would spill over into the 
implementation phase.
NSPS Implementation
Th e legislation gave the secretary of defense 
and the director of the OPM wide joint 
discretion for the design and implementation 
of the NSPS and mandated that the NSPS be 
a “fair, credible and transparent employee per-
formance appraisal system” (Ginsberg 2008, 
4). For the implementation of the NSPS, it 
required a “means for ensuring that adequate 
agency resources are allocated for the design, 
implementation, and administration of the 
performance management system.” It also 
mandated that “a means for ensuring employ-
ee involvement” and that “adequate training 
and retraining for supervisors, managers, and 
employees” be provided (16).
Following enactment, four phases can be identifi ed during which 
the DoD used diff erent strategies to put the NSPS into operation. 
Th e fi rst phase covers the initial DoD implementation strategy led 
Th e legislation gave the 
secretary of defense and the 
director of the [Offi  ce of 
Personnel Management (OPM)] 
wide joint discretion for the 
design and implementation 
of NSPS and mandated that 
the design of the system be a 
“fair, credible and transparent 
employee performance appraisal 
system.”
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 regulations as internal departmental policies. Th e OPM, however, 
urged publication of the new regulations in the Federal Register. Th e 
OPM position prevailed, and the decision to publish the regulations 
eff ectively ended the unilateral approach that the DoD previously 
had taken (Bunn 2007).
During the pause, a review of the NSPS design and implementa-
tion was conducted by fi ve work groups representing the OPM 
and DoD. Th e work groups concluded that the department should 
abandon Best Practices as its model, start the NSPS design from 
scratch, and design and implement the program under a new organ-
ization. On April 13, 2004, the recommendations were presented to 
the DoD’s Senior Leader Review Group and approved by Secretary 
Rumsfeld. Th e new strategy established the Program Executive 
Offi  ce to “establish a central, DoD-wide offi  ce to design, develop, 
and implement NSPS” (Bradshaw 2007) and outlined a new DoD–
OPM governance structure for NSPS implementation.
Th e unions also used the strategic pause to regroup and rethink their 
NSPS strategy. A majority of the unions joined forces and formed 
the United Defense Workers Coalition.
Phase 3: The NSPS Program Executive Offi ce (April 28, 2004–
January 16, 2009)
During the third phase, the NSPS human resources regulations 
were fi nalized and the revised design of NSPS was completed. Its 
two core elements—pay for performance and pay banding—though 
slightly modifi ed, remained the cornerstones of the NSPS.
Th e new implementation strategy was to roll out the NSPS in three 
phases, or “spirals.” Each spiral would include a specifi ed number 
of employees to be converted from the GS to the NSPS. In between 
each spiral, the NSPS could be modifi ed to address issues that arose 
during the previous spiral. Th e Program Executive Offi  ce hosted a 
number of meetings with unions in the summer and fall of 2004, 
during the “meet and confer” stage of the NSPS design. Th e pro-
posed NSPS human resources regulations were published for public 
comment on February 14, 2005. Th e union coalition orchestrated 
a campaign to submit comments through letters, e-mail, and the 
NSPS website. Th e fi nal regulations were printed in the Federal 
Register on November 1, 2005. Th e implementing issuances subse-
quently were published shortly before Th anksgiving of 2005.
On November 7, 2005, after the publication of the fi nal NSPS 
regulations but before the release of the implementing issuances, 
the AFGE and other coalition unions fi led suit (AFGE v. Rumsfeld). 
Th e suit challenged the NSPS in fi ve areas: (1) collaboration with 
and participation of employee representation; (2) compliance with 
independent third-party review; (3) employee rights to organize and 
bargain collectively; (4) independence of the proposed National Se-
curity Labor Relations Board; and (5) fair treatment and due process 
in the appeals process. U.S. District Court Judge Emmet Sullivan 
recommended that the DoD not implement the NSPS labor rela-
tions regulations until the court had time to consider and rule on 
congressional intent. Th e department agreed to the court’s request.
Th e case was heard in the U.S. District Court for the District of 
Columbia on January 24, 2006, and the ruling was handed down 
on February 27. Th e court ruled in favor of the unions on three key 
Pre-Collaboration Labor Relations System Options” on February 6, 
2004 (DoD 2004). Th e proposal was viewed by union leaders as a 
direct attack on employees’ rights to organize and to bargain collec-
tively, and they perceived a number of “union busting” clauses (Lee 
2004). Th e AFGE held a protest rally on February 11, 2004, at the 
U.S. Capitol, urging Congress to take action to protect employees’ 
rights. To facilitate dealing with the unions, on February 12, 2004, 
Secretary Rumsfeld appointed Gordon England, then secretary of 
the navy, as the offi  cial department liaison with unions concerning 
the development and implementation of the NSPS (Barr 2004b). 
Over the course of two days, February 26 and 27, 2004, the DoD 
and OPM joined with union leaders in a meeting of more than 
100 people to discuss the pre-decision labor relations proposal. Th e 
sessions were moderated by the Federal Mediation and Conciliation 
Service.
Although the outlined strategy and the National Defense Au-
thorization Act stated that the DoD and OPM would design and 
implement the NSPS collaboratively, there was virtually no OPM 
input in the earliest NSPS design and implementation phase, nor 
at the fi rst formal discussion with DoD employee representatives. 
In a March 9, 2004, letter to Secretary Rumsfeld (with 41 pages 
of attachments), OPM director Kay Coles James said that her staff  
had “no higher priority” than NSPS, but she criticized the DoD for 
ignoring statutory provisions of the NSPS and warned that “failure 
to execute [the NSPS] correctly could undermine everything we are 
trying to achieve with NSPS” (James 2004). She stated that the pro-
posal went against the intent expressed by Congress and the admin-
istration by abolishing veterans’ preferences and by ignoring union 
contributions (James 2004). According to James, the labor–manage-
ment proposal was developed “without any prior OPM involvement 
or union input,” which, she said, was in direct contradiction to the 
enacting legislation (James 2004). James concluded her letter by 
encouraging the DoD to reconsider its current strategy for imple-
menting the NSPS; specifi cally, she called for them to include the 
OPM as an equal partner in any future implementation strategy and 
to establish a mechanism to receive and incorporate employee input. 
On March 11, 2004, the OPM and DoD met to discuss the con-
cerns raised in James’s letter. Th e following day, Secretary Rumsfeld 
directed the establishment of a strategic and comprehensive review 
of NSPS development.
Phase 2: Strategic Pause (March 12–April 27, 2004)
Rumsfeld directed the cessation of the initial implementation 
strategy (Bunn 2007). Th e concerns with the system centered on 
perceived issues such as lack of employee involvement, lack of OPM 
collaboration, an overly aggressive and rigid timetable, inadequate 
consultation with the service components, and internal and external 
communications. Congress also had begun to urge the department 
to reconsider its implementation strategy: letters to Rumsfeld sug-
gested that he review the implementation strategy and charged him 
with not following Congress’s intent (Akaka 2004).
Th e DoD included consultation with the OPM during the strategic 
pause. Perhaps the largest issue addressed between the two agencies 
was how to release the new human resources and labor relations 
regulations. Th e department believed that reforming its person-
nel system was an internal process and preferred to release any 
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OPM issued proposed joint regulations in the Federal Register modi-
fying the NSPS to conform to the new legislation (DoD 2008).
Phase 4: Rising Political Opposition and Vanishing Political 
Support
As the 2008 presidential election approached, Senator Carl Levin 
(D-MI) and Representative Ike Skelton (D-MO), chairmen of the 
Senate and House Armed Services committees, respectively, sent a 
letter to Deputy Secretary England requesting that the DoD “refrain 
from taking any action to fi nalize the proposed rule issued May 22, 
2008 regarding the National Security Personnel System (NSPS) un-
til a new Administration has an opportunity to review and make de-
cisions with regard to the proposed rule” (Levin and Skelton 2008). 
In his response, England off ered some assurances that the DoD was 
addressing the Congress’s concerns, but he essentially declined the 
request to freeze NSPS implementation (England 2008). 
During the campaign, candidate Barack Obama responded to a let-
ter about the NSPS from Gregory Junemann, national president of 
the International Federation of Professional and Technical Engi-
neers.1 Obama said that it was “inappropriate and unwise for DoD 
to implement such a highly contentious, ill-conceived program so 
late in this administration, particularly following the vast revisions 
to the program included in the FY 08 National Defense Authoriza-
tion Act” (Obama 2008). Obama promised that if elected president, 
he would “substantially revise these NSPS regulations, and strongly 
consider a complete repeal” (Obama 2008).
Obama was elected president on November 4, and the fi nal portion 
of the NSPS regulations of the Bush administration was published 
in the January 16, 2009, Federal Register. On inauguration day, the 
Obama White House froze the advancement of any pending pro-
grams from the previous administration. Final 
NSPS regulations had been published four 
days prior, but the regulations had not yet 
gone into eff ect; consequently, the DoD was 
eff ectively barred from expanding or imple-
menting the fi nalized regulations. Moreover, 
a February 11, 2009, letter from Representa-
tives Skelton and Solomon Ortiz (D-TX), 
chair of the HASC Readiness Subcommit-
tee, to Defense Secretary Gates stressed that 
“because it will take some time for a review 
and a determination of the best course of ac-
tion to occur, we urge you to immediately halt 
the conversion of any additional employees 
to NSPS at any level or any location until the 
Administration and Congress can properly 
 address the future of the Department’s per-
sonnel system” (Skelton and Ortiz 2009).
On March 16, 2009, Deputy Defense Secretary William J. Lynn an-
nounced that the DoD and OPM would conduct a complete review 
of the NSPS (Mosquera 2009). Lynn and OPM director John Berry 
announced on May 14, 2009, that the Defense Business Board 
would form a task group to review the NSPS. Th e task group did 
not recommend abandoning the NSPS, but instead urged a “recon-
struction” to address issues of implementation, union relations, and 
employee trust, among others (Defense Business Board 2009).
issues: collective bargaining, the National Security Labor Relations 
Board, and adverse action appeals, and it ordered that the NSPS labor 
relations regulation and the employee appeals procedures implemen-
tation be frozen. Nonetheless, the court’s ruling would not stop the 
department from rolling out Spiral 1.1 for nonbargaining employees, 
a move that converted 11,000 GS employees to the NSPS.
Th e department appealed the decision to the U.S. Court of Appeals 
for the District of Columbia, and on May 18, 2007, the appeals 
court overturned the district court’s ruling. Th e appeals court rec-
ognized the law as a “statutory puzzle” but concluded that because 
there was a sunset provision imposed on the NSPS, it was clear that 
Congress intended to grant temporary authority to DoD to curtail 
collective bargaining rights. However, the ruling reaffi  rmed that after 
November 2009, either those rights must be reinstated or the sunset 
must be extended (Barr 2007). Following this ruling, the unions 
fi led a petition for the case to be heard by the entire appeals court, 
but the motion was denied. Th en, in January 2008, the AFGE fi led 
a writ of certiorari to have its case heard by the U.S. Supreme Court, 
but the Court refused to hear the case (Losey 2008). On September 17, 
2007, the appeals court lifted the injunctions against the NSPS labor 
relations regulations, and, on the same day, the DoD  announced 
that it was moving ahead with the implementation of the NSPS 
 human resources regulation; for the time being, however, the imple-
mentation would apply only to nonbargaining unit employees.
Meanwhile, the 2006 midterm elections transferred power in 
Congress as Democrats gained control in both the House and Sen-
ate. After the Democratic victories, the unions turned their eff orts 
toward Congress. In testimony before the House Armed Services 
Readiness Subcommittee, John Gage, AFGE national president, 
urged Congress to “repeal the statutory authority for NSPS” (U.S. 
House Armed Services Committee 2007).
On May 17, 2007, the House passed its 
National Defense Authorization Act for fi scal 
year 2008, which included language remov-
ing many NSPS fl exibilities and revoking the 
adverse actions, appeals, and labor relations 
portions of the NSPS (OMB 2007). Th e fi nal 
version of the act, signed into law on January 
28, 2008, reduced the scope of the NSPS, 
voiding provisions for adverse actions appeals 
and labor–management relations and requir-
ing that the NSPS follow existing govern-
ment-wide rules and regulations regarding 
reduction-in-force and workforce shaping. 
Th e act modifi ed NSPS pay-for-performance 
provisions by mandating that all employees 
with a performance rating above “unaccepta-
ble” would receive at least 60 percent of the annual GS government-
wide pay increase as a base salary increase, and by requiring that all 
employees who are rated above “unacceptable” receive locality-based 
comparability payments, like all other employees eligible for locality 
pay under the General Schedule. Th e act also put a limit of 100,000 
employees who could be converted to the NSPS in any calendar 
year, and it required the comptroller general to conduct an annual 
review of employee satisfaction with the NSPS. Pay for performance 
and pay banding largely remained. On May 22, 2008, the DoD and 
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previous administration. Final 
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broad grants of authority helped avoid contentious congressional de-
bate over the specifi cs of reform, but when the details were revealed, 
disagreement arose again and congressional intent became an issue 
in the subsequent challenges in court. Th ese events suggest that 
proponents of future reforms might consider taking the approach 
used with the Civil Service Reform Act in 1976—that is, develop a 
proposal collaboratively and present Congress with a detailed reform 
plan that can be debated and amended with the participation of all 
stakeholders. Th ere are both advantages and disadvantages to such 
an approach. Can any administration make a compelling argument 
for reforms such as pay for performance? Is there any performance 
management and reward system that unions will accept? It may not 
be possible to reach agreement on these issues, but policy makers 
will need to consider the benefi ts of potentially winning the battle at 
the risk of losing the war.
Opponents could not stop the enactment of the NSPS, but the 
failure to achieve consensus led to a continuation of the fi ght in 
the courts during the implementation phase. But there were other 
internal issues in implementation as well. Alexander, Barlow, and 
Haskins argue that the NSPS implementation had an aggressive 
schedule: “many stakeholders felt the schedule for NSPS was too 
rushed. . . . the PEO [Program Executive Offi  ce] took risks in cost 
and performance in order to meet the proposed schedule” (2010, 
108). An analysis of survey and study data against the Program Execu-
tive Offi  ce’s Key Performance Parameters indicates that although 
the supporting infrastructure worked in favor of the NSPS, the 
parameters of high-performance workplace, appropriate schedule, and 
fi scal soundness needed work. Ultimately, the system failed on the 
parameters of agility, supportiveness, credibility, and trust. (Alexander, 
Barlow, and Haskin 2010, 105). Th ese data suggest that there are 
issues with both the implementation management and the percep-
tions of the workforce that impact the success of reform. Th ese 
issues appear similar to those seen in previous unsuccessful attempts 
to implement performance management and link pay to perform-
ance under the Civil Service Reform Act: the original legislation’s 
merit pay plan was replaced by the Performance Management and 
Recognition System in 1984, which, in turn, was abandoned in 
1993 (see Brook 2000; Ingraham and Moynihan 2000). So, history 
suggests that personnel management reform in the federal govern-
ment that involves pay for performance is neither easy to design nor 
easy to implement. Instead, it requires that a 
great deal of attention be paid to matters of 
trust, transparency, and communication with 
the workforce and its representatives.
Finally, there are considerations of persist-
ence and sustainability. Support for the NSPS 
waned when both Rumsfeld and Chu left the 
DoD, along with other political and career 
leaders who were passionate about reform but 
left their jobs or moved on. As a result, when 
indiff erence and opposition grew, no one was 
left to argue strongly for the NSPS except 
career offi  cials charged with managing the 
implementation. Implementation diffi  cul-
ties emerged, political opposition grew, and, 
ultimately, the Bush administration could 
neither sustain reform in the DoD nor pursue 
While the task group’s review was under way, congressional lead-
ers were moving to end the NSPS under the National Defense 
Authorization Act for fi scal year 2010. Representative Carol Shea-
Porter (D-NH) introduced an amendment in June that would 
mandate that all NSPS employees receive 100 percent of the GS 
annual raise, “require the Defense Secretary to prepare to end the 
controversial system, or submit a report to Congress demonstrat-
ing why it should remain,” and abolish the NSPS within a year 
unless Congress decided to act on it (Parker 2009). In September 
2009, the DoD announced that in light of the ongoing review and 
concerns with the NSPS, employees covered by the NSPS would 
receive the same salary adjustment as their GS counterparts (Rosen-
berg 2009b).
Th e House–Senate conference committee on the National Defense 
Authorization Act released its report on October 7, 2009, calling 
for repeal of the NSPS and mandating all NSPS employees to be re-
converted to the GS by January 1, 2012. Th e conference agreement 
required the secretary of defense to begin returning the 200,000 
NSPS employees to the GS system within six months of the law’s 
enactment. Th e conference report also required that “no employee 
shall suff er any loss of or decrease in pay” when reverting to the GS 
system (Rosenberg 2009a). President Obama signed the National 
Defense Authorization Act into law on October 28, 2009.
Is Reform Dead? Implications for the Future
Th is case is about how an administration and a cabinet agency 
recognized an opportunity and seized the initiative to enact and 
 attempt to implement important and controversial personnel 
management reforms. Th e NSPS currently is being unraveled. It is 
possible that the policy window has closed, that support for reforms 
of the type proposed in the NSPS may be gone, and that further 
reform is not possible any time soon.
Yet calls for policies, processes, and structures to incentivize, im-
prove, and reward performance in the public sector continue. At the 
time of the demise of the NSPS, OPM director Berry announced 
that the Obama administration would attempt to craft a govern-
ment-wide package of civil service reforms that would include pay 
for performance (Rosenberg 2009a). In addition, the House version 
of the National Defense Authorization Act for fi scal year 2012 
“encourage[s] DoD to use employee perform-
ance rather than job tenure to determine 
incentive pay under its new performance 
management system” (Long 2011). Strategies 
for both enacting and implementing any such 
proposal in the future can be informed by the 
history of the NSPS and the Department of 
Homeland Security.
In this case, we saw that a new personnel 
system can be successfully enacted but fail 
in implementation. Th e legislative victories 
were won without achieving consensus on the 
policies among key stakeholders. In fact, the 
persuasive arguments for enactment of the 
NSPS were based more on national security 
concerns than on the merits of the reforms 
themselves. Th e statute’s general language and 
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implementation. Th e legislative 
victories were won without 
achieving consensus on the 
policies among key stakeholders. 
In fact, the persuasive 
arguments for enactment of 
the NSPS were based more on 
national security concerns than 
on the merits of the reforms 
themselves.
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its goal of expanding personnel management reform to the rest of 
the federal government.
Th is case provides questions and considerations for future reforms. 
First, can a set of reforms be formulated that (1) achieves a reason-
able consensus among policy makers and stakeholders, (2) can 
be implemented in a way that is transparent and trusted by the 
workforce, and (3) can be sustained politically and managerially 
over time? Second, should the demonstration projects be reexam-
ined to see whether there are clues to success in these areas that can 
be applied more widely? Finally, in considering these questions, 
can reformers make the case that management fl exibility and pay 
for performance are appropriate and that the benefi ts of any such 
reforms outweigh the costs? Understanding the history of personnel 
management reform can help in creating sustainable reform in the 
future.
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Note
1. Obama also responded on September 9, 2008, to a letter from AFGE president 
John Gage using the same form letter that he sent to Junemann.
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